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Abstract
Welsh Studies as a cross-disciplinary field is growing both in Wales and beyond. Historians, 
sociologists, political scientists and others are increasingly collaborating in their study of the 
evolution of Welsh identity. This concept which was for so long monopolised and marked 
by a strong reference to the Welsh language and the importance of having an ethnic Welsh 
identity is now giving way to a more inclusive notion of what it means to be Welsh. Welsh 
identity has become a more open and inclusive notion since the institutional reforms brought 
about  by  devolution  have  anchored  themselves  in  daily  realities  and  subsequently  in 
conceptual approaches to the problematizing of Welsh identity. 
Résumé
Les  études  galloises  constituent  un  nouveau  champ  inter-disciplinaire  où  historiens, 
sociologues,  politologues   etc.,  au  pays  de  Galles  même et  au-delà  de  ses  frontières,  se 
rencontrent  dans leur  recherche  sur  l'identité  galloise contemporaine.  Les réformes post-
dévolutionnaires ont induit des changements dans les comportements et les mentalités des 
Gallois,  entraînant  une  évolution  dans  la  définition  de  l'identité  galloise.  Cette  nouvelle 
identité n'est plus définie par les critères ethno-linguistiques d'antan mais se situe plutôt dans 
une nouvelle aire où les notions de citoyenneté et d'inclusion  priment. 
Mots-clés
Pays de Galles, identité, problématisation, britannique, politique 
1. The people and the land.
« Welsh Studies »  is  a field of research which is  growing slowly outside Wales (particularly  in North 
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America) while within Wales researchers and intellectuals are beginning to leave their own well-defined 
fields of study (geography, history, literature, sociology, politics, gender studies …) to engage in more 
cross-disciplinary projects and programmes. These collaborative efforts are concentrated on investigations 
into Wales and Welsh identity/identities. Framing Welsh identity is thus a question which is exercising 
many people at present as the Welsh Assembly, by its very existence, is creating and defining its own 
legitimacy. One of the basic interrogations underpinning this surge of activity is the question of whether 
today one refers to « Welsh people » or the « people of Wales», for the tricky problem of identity based on 
language skills  is  still  very much to the fore.  These aspects  do not arise in the case of  Scotland and 
Scottish identity because Scotland's past as a unified kingdom, the maintained presence of its institutions, 
the absence of a major language problem and the strong nationalist demand for devolution make it a 
clearly different case to Wales. Who is Welsh? 
The two intertwined, interpenetrative elements of territory and language have fashioned Welsh identity, as 
has the country's resulting history. Difficult terrain fashioned communities and mentalities while hindering 
unity. The nature of the land also determined industrial and agricultural differences and subsequent 
political divisions; thus the pattern and nature of nationalism and politics in Wales have hinged on factors 
that have been in place for centuries.
Wales covers about 21,000 sq km which represents about a tenth of the British land mass although it is 
home to only about 2.9 million people, roughly 5% of the total UK population. The population is 
concentrated along the flat coastlands especially in the south around the cities of Cardiff, the capital, 
Swansea and Newport, and in the narrow valleys that run down to the sea. These areas were long the site 
of industrial activity such as metallurgy and mining. The central high plateau, dominated by rural activities, 
has always made communication and transport difficult within Wales. In the centre and the north-east the 
low population density has played a crucial role in the survival of the language. Similarly, communication 
difficulties led to comparatively isolated communities being self-sufficient and even inward looking, 
receptive to the ideas of self help and independence fostered by Nonconformist religion, very close knit, 
distinguishing themselves clearly from other social units like other villages or religious groups. This 
tendency to identify with smaller rather than larger entities is still alive today, reflected internally in 
identification with a neighbourhood rather than with a town, and in Wales's outward policies, reflected in 
European regional affiliations.
Geography also explains in part why Wales never experienced the political unity that the kingdom of 
Scotland once enjoyed. Gwynfor Evans, the leading figure of modern Welsh nationalism, blamed 
geography and the resulting historical and political scattering of the Welsh across their country for a lack 
of political and national cohesion : « Ironically, one of the reasons Wales has found it difficult to obtain 
decentralisation is that the Welsh themselves are too decentralist to unite » (Evans 2003 : 215)
However, we could take the view that it is History that gives us the best view to framing Welsh identity 
for there has been a striking and sustained renaissance in the study of Welsh history over the past two 
generations. There was a dearth of research in this area until the 1960s when a number of authoritative 
historians such as Glanmor Williams, K O Morgan, and Gwyn Alf Williams at Swansea and Aberystwyth 
undertook a transformation of this field. These first historians were preoccupied with a need to highlight 
national unity and the wholeness of Wales, attempting to pinpoint « When was Wales? » (Williams 1985). 
Since then, institutional and social factors have prompted the rise of a group of historians who have 
mainly been concerned with social history and empirical, archival research, writing a history 'from below'. 
Some have written more from a committed, political viewpoint but what connects such eminent 
researchers as Chris Williams, Geraint Jenkins, Duncan Tanner, Bill Jones and John Davies is their view of 
themselves as « Remembrancers » (« passeurs de mémoire »).
However, while inevitably the actions of forces both inside and outside Wales (globalization, mass media, 
movement  of  people,  information  technology  …)  are  transforming  Wales  into  a  more  mutable  and 
fragmented community of peoples, Welsh history cannot be fully understood without reference to its 
relationship with England. The story of Wales is not so much the history of kings as the history of the 
people, « y gwerin », and of their political and cultural leaders. Since the first incursions of the English King 
Edward  I   in  the  late  13th  century  Wales  has   been  subsumed  into  the  history  of  England  (the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1888 entry reads: « For ' Wales' see 'England' »), and Gwynfor Evans was adamant 
that ignorance of their own history was - and is – the reason why many Welsh people have been slow in 
coming to a sense of nationhood: «  In Wales, the weakened sense of a collective past, and, therefore, of a collective  
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future, is not only due to a lack of national institutions. » (Evans 1996 : 134). His guidance and leadership of Plaid 
Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, were to be driven by a strong sense of the long term cultural unity 
which has held the country together longer and better than any political arrangement.
The joined histories of England and Wales have been marked, since the Acts of Union in 1536 and 1542, 
by a symbiotic relationship that has at times been mutually beneficial but which many believe to have been 
mainly dominated by England to the detriment of Wales and its distinct identity. Establishing English law, 
excluding Welsh speakers from public office and enforcing the supremacy of Church of England were the 
first instances of this. A distinct Welsh identity continued to exist in matters of religion, with the growth 
of Puritanism in Wales, especially Methodism in the 18th century, and the Welsh language was often the 
vehicle  of  that  faith.  However,  the  Industrial  Revolution  of  the  19th century  brought  an  influx  of 
Anglophone  immigrants  mainly  to  the  south  of  the  country  thus  contributing  to  the  decline  of  the 
language and to a certain dilution of identity. Politically, Wales had been dominated by the Liberal party 
and the Radical movement but allegiance to the Labour Party and class solidarity became the political 
characteristics of the country during most of the 20th century. Economic depression in the 1930s and the 
post-war decline of industry (of which the 1984-1985 miners' strike is perhaps the most striking event) has 
transformed the country. Economic structures have changed as deindustrialisation has been accompanied 
by the arrival of light industries, service industries, the feminisation of the workforce and more prominent 
inward investment by British and overseas concerns. Also, religious observance has declined, as it has in 
the rest of Britain and this has been in parallel with the erosion of the Welsh language.
2. Gwnewch bopeth yn Gymraeg ! (do everything in Welsh).
Today approximately 600,000 people speak Welsh, which is about 20% of the population and the table 
below shows how the number of Welsh speakers has declined over the years.
Table 1. Numbers of Welsh speakers 
year population % Welsh speakers 
1891 1,519,000 54,4%
1911 2,421,000 43,5%
1931 2,593,000 36,8%
1961 2,644,000 26%
1991 2,891,000 18,7%
2001 2,903,085 21%
Source :Welsh Language Board, UK Office for National Statistics
This decline is easily explained by industrialization, the proximity of England and indeed globalization, and 
it has accelerated as modern forms of communication, TV, radio, press, and the internet have expanded. 
Is language therefore an element to be taken into account when attempting to define Welsh identity? The 
early struggle for recognition of Wales as a separate country or region and the first claims for autonomous 
government, and indeed the founding of Plaid Cymru, the nationalist party of Wales (1925) were based on 
what could be termed as mythical values surrounding Welsh cultural heritage which was intimately linked 
to the language. Modern consciousness of the importance of the language as an identity marker and of the 
danger threatened by its decline was first aroused by the poet Saunders Lewis in a 1965 BBC radio 
broadcast – « Tynged yr Iaith » (The Fate of the Language) warning of the disappearance of the language, 
and of specific Welsh identity. A long and sometimes violent campaign by militants from Cymdeithas yr  
Iaith Cymraeg (The Welsh Language Society) eventually led to the passing of two laws (1967 Welsh 
Language Act and the 1993 Welsh Language Act) to protect and promote the language, giving it parity 
with English, and making the learning of Welsh obligatory in schools.
The recent increase in the number of speakers is due to efforts by the Welsh Language Board in 
conjunction with the Welsh Assembly's language promotion programme, Iaith Pawb (Language for All). 
The defenders of the language promote it as giving «added value» to the country, to Welsh identity and 
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argue that the language enjoys colossal good will and support. It is hoped that the new awareness of all 
things Welsh, the growth in the awareness of national identity that seems to have accompanied devolution 
will also promote Welsh cultural identity and the movement is inspired by the example of other countries 
like Finland which, in the wake of political autonomy, have come to enjoy a cultural and linguistic 
reinforcement. Their dream is of a truly bi-lingual Wales. This project is supported by the fact that the UK 
government has ratified the 1992 Council of Europe European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages.
The detractors believe that it is useless to promote the language as so few people really speak it. Often 
described as a « barbaric » language, and attacked throughout history, from the Acts of Union to the 
notorious « Blue Books » (the 1847 Education Report) the language is still a divisive element today among 
the Welsh themselves. Welsh speakers are viewed with hostility by Anglophone Welsh for they view 
Welsh speakers as a self-appointed elite who sideline non Welsh speakers and who reserve promotions 
and favours within Wales and Welsh institutions for a select few.
 Nevertheless, despite the criticism of the way statistics are defined and gathered, we can confidently say 
that Welsh is the everyday language of about half a million people throughout Wales although its use can 
be tied clearly to certain areas. In 1985 Denis Balsom determined that Wales could be divided into three 
main language areas, according to self-identification (which has since been enhanced and modified by 
other researchers). Those zones were, firstly, « British Wales », which was the eastern half of Wales, the 
Cardiff area and Pembroke in the extreme south-west. In this zone people identified with Britain and 
spoke English and no Welsh. « Welsh Wales » incorporated the rest of the south-east and included the 
Valleys. These people identified themselves with Wales but generally did not speak Welsh. Finally, « Y Fro 
Gymraeg » corresponded mainly to the western half of Wales and it is the area where the population 
identify with Wales and also speak Welsh. The last two areas have shared similar voting patterns in the 
1997 referendum and in Assembly elections (Williams 2003 : 10).
The language is today gaining ground and more speakers in urban areas such as Cardiff and Swansea and 
in Monmouthshire and Glamorgan. It is most under threat in the north and the west due to tourists, 
English retirees and second home buyers and to the cities of Liverpool and Manchester social services' « 
dumping » of problem families in the struggling guesthouses on north coast resorts like Rhyl and 
Llandudno.
3. Politics in Wales.
The language issue is inextricably linked to politics and in particular to the story of Plaid Cymru. The party 
was however long associated with a romantic,  idealized view of an agrarian past,  with a subsequently 
strong ethnic approach to the question of Welshness. In fact the party's problem in capturing votes was 
that it was (and to some extent still is) seen as « too Welsh » and therefore off-putting to some voters.  
Long associated with Gwynfor Evans, it sprang up in the line of a certain renaissance and a revival of 
Welsh sentiment, the view of Wales as a nation. Its demands for autonomy eventually shook the statewide 
Conservative and Labour parties, and following Gwynfor Evans's historic election as the nationalist MP 
for Carmarthen in 1966 the first moves were made to mollify the nationalists. We can say briefly that the 
first  ideas  for  devolution  were  made  by  the  Labour  government  in  the  late  60s  in  a  context  of 
constitutional reform but also to save Labour seats in Wales (and Scotland).
There is some truth then in saying that, politically, the Labour party has also been instrumental in shaping 
Welsh identity. This happened initially through the support that Labour received in Wales when the 
Liberal party lost ground to it and when Labour came to represent class solidarity above all, which 
persisted throughout the latter half of the 20th century. However, there may also be some truth in saying 
that since 1997 New Labour has been instrumental in helping to carve out a new identity for the Welsh.
Comparing the results of the two referendums held in Wales helps to remind us of how little enthusiasm 
there was for the proposals set out in the 1978 Wales Act :
Table 2
Wales referendum results 1 March 1979               turnout 58.8%
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« Do you want the provisions of the Wales Act 1978 to be put into effect? »
YES 243,048 votes 20.2% voters 12 % electorate
NO 956,330 79.8% 46%
Source : British election survey/ BBC Political research unit.
Some of the reasons for this defeat in Wales include the fact that the amendment requiring 40% of the 
electorate to approve of the contents of the Wales Act and the fact that this legislation was framed 
beforehand. The economic and social climate of the time (the 1978-79 «winter of discontent») created a 
climate of mistrust in the government. Issues had become very polarized and state-wide there was 
dominating interest for Scotland. Fears of what devolution would entail included the break up of Britain 
and while Anglophones feared domination by Welsh speakers, those in the Welsh-speaking north were 
disgruntled by the idea that politics would be dominated by Anglophones in Cardiff. In any case, the 
Welsh context was diluted by British party politics, especially by internal Labour wrangling. Prominent 
anti-devolutionists included the future party leader, Neil Kinnock. However, eighteen years later British 
politics, Welsh politics and the population of Wales had evolved and changed.
Table 3
Wales referendum results 18 September 1997               turnout 50.1%
I agree that there should be a Welsh Assembly 559,419 votes 50.3% voters
I do not agree that there should be a Welsh Assembly 552,698 49.7%
Source : British election survey/ BBC Political research unit.
3. The "quiet earthquake".
What had happened between the two referendums to explain the difference in the outcome? The reasons 
are  various  and complex but  are  deemed to have  been influenced  by  the  earlier,  favourable  vote  in 
Scotland on 11 September 1997. While the devolution measures were virtually identical to those of 1979, 
the  positive  outcome  has  often  been  attributed  to  eighteen  years  of  Conservative  government  in 
Westminster while support for the Tories dwindled in Wales. However, this period witnessed the rise in 
the number and prominence of institutions put in place by both Labour and Conservative governments 
which  were  allowing  the  development  of  a  civic  national  identity  in  Wales  which  had  created  an 
increasingly strong «proto- State». Some of these institutions are quite venerable, such as the National 
Library and the University (1907). Cardiff was officially designated as the capital city in 1955, the Welsh 
Office was created in 1964 and the Welsh Development Agency in 1976. Meanwhile other bodies sprang 
up such as the Welsh Arts Council, the Wales Tourist Board, the Sports Council for Wales, the Welsh 
TUC and the Welsh CBI, the Welsh Football Association, the Welsh Rugby Union, the Welsh National 
Opera, etc., etc. Although Wales never knew a constitutional convention like Scotland these institutional 
creations have helped to create and develop a sense of nationhood.
However, and perhaps just as importantly, the 1997 referendum results also point to the fact that a 
generational shift had taken place. A new population voted, reflecting demographic, economic and even 
psychological changes. Those under the age of 45 voted «yes» by a margin of 3 : 2 (Osmond 2007 : 20). 
Although there were 87,000 fewer voters in the second referendum there was a massive shift in the 
number of « yes» votes, up by 316,365 on the 1979 result while the «no» votes dropped by 404,632. Was 
this in fact a vote of confidence in Wales and Welshness and an affirmation of a new Welsh identity? John 
Osmond thinks so especially as regular polls have revealed that since 1997 the constitutional preference of 
a growing number of Welsh people is for a Welsh Parliament (1997 :19.6%; 1999: 29.9%; 2001 : 38.8%; 
2003 : 37.8%; 2006 : 42.1%. Osmond, 2007 : 21).
The creation of the aforementioned institutions may have gone some way towards helping to shape a 
distinct Welsh identity within the British framework but an important characteristic of many of them was 
that they were « quangos » or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations, which created a series 
of problems because they were run by appointees or co-opted members in unelected bodies that were 
unaccountable to the electorate. The resulting « democracy deficit » contributed to the specific political 
19
atmosphere of the long period of Conservative government (1979 – 1997). « The case for a measure of  
democratic control over Welsh life by the people of Wales was energized not retarded by the political, industrial and economic  
traumas of the Thatcherite years » (Williams 2000 : 241)
Margaret Thatcher's affirmation that « there is no such thing as society » (31 October 1987) infuriated the 
communitarian values of the Welsh, forced women in particular out of the shadows to tell their stories 
and prompted the Welsh historians referred to earlier, and others, into more fruitful approaches to their 
discipline and research. Thus history, like politics, has been caught up in issues of religion, language and 
nationality in Wales and in the current debate over identity or rather identities. Perhaps the plural should 
be preferred because many feel and know today that there is no longer a homogenous Welsh identity.
Since the end of the 1980s, in Wales there has arisen a kind of consensus, a move away from previous, 
narrow definitions of Welsh identity based on ethnic criteria of language and culture, which had 
maintained divisions within Welsh society, to a new kind of collective identity:
The Welsh are in the process of being defined not in terms of shared occupational experience or common 
religious experience or the survival of an ancient European language or for contributing to the Welsh 
radical tradition, but rather by reference to the institutions that they inhabit, influence or react to. This 
new identity may lack the ethical and political imperatives that characterized Welsh life for two centuries 
but it increasingly appears to be the only identity available. (Williams 2000 : 240). 
It was becoming clear that many of the characteristics that marked out the people of Wales were 
competing and conflictive and they were gradually being unmasked as anachronistic and misleading. Thus, 
if a new identity was to be generated that could accommodate all those who had made Wales their home, 
all those who, whatever their birthplace, ethnic background, linguistic ability or even self definition, 
constituted the « Welsh people » it would and will have to be pluralist, inclusive and constructed on a basis 
of citizenship rather than on the possession of certain « essential » attributes, attitudes or beliefs. Wales 
needs to establish clearly a new civic identity as opposed to the old ethnic identity. Similarly Plaid Cymru 
had to rethink its image and its policies because the people of Wales could not recognize themselves in the 
Party's original, narrow, language based definitions. This new conception of identity was what 
underpinned Ron Davies' view of devolution. As Labour's first post-devolution Secretary of State for 
Wales he was known as «the architect of devolution» and had famously stated that « devolution is a process not  
an event » (Davies : 1999). Ron Davies further articulated the concept that Welsh identity was mutating and 
moving forward, emphasizing the fact that it had to be an inclusive identity, for all the people who lived in 
Wales, whatever their origin or background (Davies 1999 : 6-7).
This very recent, shifting nature of Welsh civic and cultural identities goes some way to explaining changes 
in popular and political attitudes to devolution from 1979-97 and why and how language ceased to be 
such a decisive issue. But even at the present moment the debate is still moving and shifting in focus and 
not just in the world of politics or in academia. In the world of culture too Wales is re-shaping itself, re-
defining itself, re-inventing itself, partly in reaction to the new politics. There is a wide cultural renaissance 
within post devolution Wales that is epitomized in Peter Lord's Imaging the Nation (2000). In the three 
volumes of this work he set out to establish and recover the visual heritage of the country as a narrative of 
Wales. For Peter Lord, and others, the notion of cultural regeneration accompanies that of political rebirth 
:
It has often been alleged that a national consciousness heavily conditioned by the needs of differentiation 
from a dominant neighbour is a characteristic Welsh weakness. As a result of the political and economic 
decline of that neighbour, a complementary growth in our own self-confidence and a wider change in 
perceptions of nationality, it is the hope of many at the beginning of the twenty-first century that this 
essentially colonized state of mind may at last be transcended. (Lord 2000 : 9)
This observation is particularly interesting because of the reference to « colonialism » because academic 
discussion has recently embarked on a debate, on Welsh identity and problematizing Wales as to whether 
or not Wales can be qualified as a «post-colonial» country or not. Can it be qualified as a colony of 
England and is it now in a period after colonialism, witnessing the withdrawal of imperial forces? Or is 
Wales a case for «postcolonial» studies, where disparate forms and representations, reading practices and 
values circulate across the barrier between colonial rule and national independence? (Aaron / Williams : 
2005). 
Thus politicians, historians and cultural commentators are coming together in agreement that a new Welsh 
identity should accommodate all those who made Wales their home whatever their birthplace, ethnic 
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origin, linguistic competence or even their self defined identification. The basis of citizenship should be 
pluralistic and inclusive and not depend on possession of essential (internal) attributes, attitudes or beliefs. 
This reflection is also accompanied by the realisation that the concept of the nation-state is now out of 
date and is no longer a viable goal for those who would wish to see a greater autonomy for Wales. Greater 
visibility within a European framework is deemed by many to be a more realistically achievable aim, given 
the fuzzy, unclear nature of Wales's borders – internal and external - and the implications of the very close 
relations with England, both the recognized and the unacknowledged.
4. A new identity.
Nevertheless, despite this progressive and dynamic reflection and investigation, the answer to the original 
question, « Who is Welsh? » still remains elusive. Those who have carried out enquiries into Welsh identity 
have found it shifting and difficult to pin down. It is less positively experienced than in Scotland.
The concept of national identity was one examined by the Welsh Election Study Survey in 1979 which 
asked respondents to identify themselves as «British, Welsh, English or whatever» and they found that 
among those who voted «Yes» in the referendum 76% of them identified themselves as Welsh and 19% 
said they were British (Foulkes et al. 1983 : 210). «No» voters were 50% Welsh and 45% British. However, 
among those who declared they were normally Labour supporters and also Welsh identifiers only 33% 
voted in favour of the referendum proposal. This result shows that in 1979 class solidarity, expressed in 
the support for Labour, was stronger than a Welsh national identity.
However, by the time the 1997 referendum was held more sophisticated analyses showed rather different 
results. Earlier in the May 1997 general election the people of Wales had elected candidates exclusively 
from the three parties committed to some measure of devolution and no Conservative MPs were elected 
to Westminster. It was discovered that most « Yes » votes came from the Western, Welsh-speaking areas 
and the Welsh-thinking former industrial Valleys. Also, young people had voted in favour of the Welsh 
Assembly, but it is not sure whether this indicated a growing real consciousness of Welshness or not. 
Interestingly, a large number of «Yes» votes were recorded in Monmouthshire, the county on the English 
border which has been attached to both England and Wales at different periods. Further research carried 
out in Wales 1997, 1999 and 2001, using the mobile « Moreno » scale of self-identification, revealed that a 
growing number of people identified themselves as Welsh, (though there was no drop in the number who 
also defined themselves as British).In 1997, 42.9% identified themselves as « Welsh » or « more Welsh 
than British » but by 2001 this figure had risen to 48.1%. (Jones / Scully 2003). This seems to indicate a 
polarisation of national identity, which is stronger among younger generations. It also points to the fact 
that Welshness is becoming more attractive.
However, research carried out in 1998, just before the first Welsh Assembly elections, also revealed some 
interesting results. Richard Haesly tried to discover how national identities and « imagined communities 
» (Anderson 1991) are linked (Haesly 2005). According to his findings, the Welsh imagined community 
appears to be fundamentally more contested than the more easily forged Scottish identity. He determined 
that the Welsh respondents were not nationalists, and not sure if Wales is a meaningful nation before 
concluding that Wales is seen as a divided nation, with a thin sense of identity and a sense that Welsh 
history is relatively unimportant. However, the interviewees did share a strong emotional bond with Wales 
that replaced rather than enhanced specific ideas about the subjective meaning of contemporary 
Welshness. This focussed on the importance of sport and the national teams, beating England and a 
general anti-Englishness. These people are sure they are Welsh, but not sure what precisely Wales is or 
who is Welsh. He discovered a pride in the culture, but which was (or is) rather low level. Further research 
carried out in Flintshire in north-east Wales revealed hierarchical notions of Welshness with respondents 
divulging perceived degrees of «real» Welshness, (Evans 2006). Respondents self-identified as being 
«Welsh» but not as Welsh as someone from Aberystwyth (on the west coast) for example. The 
respondents seemed to acknowledge that their Welshness was an identity that was internalised but it was 
something that was constantly being negotiated as if living in a place on the margin of national space 
seems to shape conceptions of national identity in a modern national polity that is still in its early days. 
Contrast this with the general impression that throughout Wales there is nevertheless a very strong sense 
of « community » that binds the nation together (Le Disez 2005).
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5. Conclusion.
Can Welsh identity be « framed » therefore? Can it in fact be pinned down or is it too diffuse and indeed 
multiple? Devolution and national government for Wales is helping the move towards a reinforced and 
inclusive  sense  of  identity  which  is  more  specifically  Welsh.  Wales  is  shifting  and  changing  and  re-
inventing itself, almost despite the Welsh themselves sometimes for theexistence of a nationalistic national 
identity is not the same as it is in Scotland. The absence of such a type in Wales suggests that Scotland and 
Wales each represent a very different political environment with a differing national consciousness. If such 
a new, inclusive multi-faceted Welsh identity exists today then who can frame it? As Raymond Williams 
put it : « Who speaks for Wales? » (Williams 1971). Ten years after devolution and the creation of an all-
Wales institution whose powers are slowly increasing, it has to be the National Assembly that assumes this 
task. Wales no longer possesses a homogenous identity and the old identity markers (language, religion…) 
are crumbling and disappearing. Welsh identity is becoming diverse, fragmented and multi-faceted : 2.1% 
of  the  population or  62,000 people  are  from ethnic  minorities  (2001 Census)  and only the  National 
Assembly can now hold the country together and represent Wales to and for the Welsh. In the face of 
globalisation  and  the  internet,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  harder  to  maintain  cultural  or  national 
distinctiveness but Wales is shifting, changing and re-inventing itself. At a time when the Assembly is set 
to enjoy new legislative powers there are encouraging signs that the people of Wales are understanding the 
potential of the Assembly. Participation in the 2007 elections rose to 43.5 % from the low of 38% in 2003 
(The  Electoral  Commission,  2007  www.electoralcommission.co.uk)  and  the  voters  elected  a  coalition 
government where Labour now share power with Plaid Cymru. Unprecedented and promising.
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